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SHUTTING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT
ALAN L. FELD*

Actions of the federal government cost money. Legislative processes that
specify the amounts and purposes of governmental expenditures control the
scope and content of government actions.' To paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall, the power to withhold spending involves the power to destroy.2
Those involved in the legislative process ordinarily do not engage in wholesale or sudden dismantling of government activities through unheralded failures to provide funds. While disputes over funding constitute a regular part of
the nation's political activity, these controversies usually concern adjustments
in the level of spending and of agency operations. A decision to terminate an
agency usually takes the form of termination of authority rather than an
3
unannounced cut-off of funds.
This paper discusses the unusual case, the failure to appropriate funds for
ongoing operations. The rules that govern such events carry intrinsic importance; they deal with intensely practical concerns of government administra* Professor, Boston University. My thanks for helpful comments on earlier drafts to
Howell Jackson, Pnina Lahav, Larry Sager, Aviam Soifer, and Larry Yackle.
I Appropriations, like any other legislation, require passage in each House and
approval by the President. If the President vetoes an appropriation it may still become
law with a two-thirds vote in each House. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. This Article occasionally follows common practice in speaking of Congress as making the appropriations
when the above joint process is meant.
2 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
Relatively little scholarship has dealt with the federal spending power. For a notable
exception see Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) (discussing the constitutional structure, history, and practices of federal spending). See also
Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: the Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1988) (examining the ways in which the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act alters the legislative and administrative limitations of federal budgeting). The
relationship of spending and federalism is analyzed in Soifer, Truisms That Never Will
Be True: The Tenth Amendment and the Spending Power, 57 U. CoLo. L. REV. 793
(1986) (analyzing the tenth amendment and rules of law which limit congressional
spending power). For a discussion of permissible conditions on federal spending see
Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1103, 1125-26 (1987).
I See, e.g., Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, § 3, 98
Stat. 1703 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1551-1556 (1982 & Supp. V 1987))

(terminating and transferring certain functions of aeronautics board to Secretary of
Transportation).
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tion. They also present statutory and constitutional questions that go to the
fundamental structure of the federal government and the separation of powers
among its political branches. The judicial branch never has prescribed how
ongoing government agencies should behave in the absence of appropriated
operating funds. While the Supreme Court has addressed separation-of-powers
clashes in recent years with unwonted vigor and has settled some heavily disputed issues, 4 the rules that currently govern appropriations lapses appear in
an opinion rendered by the Attorney General in the closing days of the Carter

Administration ("1981 OAG"). 5 Unfortunately, the legal analysis of the 1981

4 For recent examples see Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 664 (1989)
(finding no separation-of-powers impediment to placing the United States Sentencing
Commission, an independent body, within the judicial branch); Morrison v. Olson, 108
S. Ct. 2597, 2620-21 (1988) (holding that the Ethics in Government Act does not
violate the principle of separation-of-powers because Congress does not retain an
impermissible degree of control over the independent counsel).
Consider the legislative veto as an example of the dispute-settling quality of these
cases. Congress treated the device as a constitutionally permissible check on delegated
powers for most of the post-World War II period. See, e.g., Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 297, 334
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 604 (1982)), amended by 2 U.S.C. § 684 (1988) (allowing
either House of Congress to veto any presidential deferral by passing an impoundment
resolution); War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(a), 87 Stat. 555, 556-57
(1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1982)) (authorizing Congress to force the
withdrawal of troops by concurrent resolution); Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L.
No. 76-19, § 24, 53 Stat. 561, 562 (allowing for implementation of a presidential
agency reorganization plan sixty days after the plan is sent to Congress, unless Congress vetoes the plan). For a comprehensive list of statutes containing a legislative veto
see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1003-13 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). Presidents
often stated constitutional objections but have signed the legislation containing the veto
provisions. See Henry, The Legislative Veto in Search of Constitutional Limits, 16

HARV. J.

ON LEGis.

735, 737 n.7 (1979) (stating that every president since Woodrow

Wilson has questioned the constitutionality of the legislative veto). Scholars have
presented widely differing views. Compare, Ginnane, The Control of FederalAdministration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953)

(arguing that implementing the use of congressional resolutions and subjecting executive actions to committee resolution will alter the traditional distribution of power
between Congress and the executive branch in a fashion that is inconsistent with constitutional directives) with Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of
the Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 565
(1953) (arguing that limited congressional involvement in matters of the executive
branch does not offend separation-of-powers and may lead to greater legislative efficiency). For a more complete list of scholarly opinions both for and against the legislative veto, see Chadha, 462 U.S. at 976 n.12 (White, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court's opinion in Chadha holding the legislative veto unconstitutional, even though
criticized, has ended the debate. Id. at 944-59.
Applicability of Antideficiency Act Upon a Lapse in Agency Appropriations, 43
Op. Att'y Gen. 29 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 OAG].
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OAG reflects the clear institutional stake of the executive branch in the outcome, so as to flaw the result.6
Although an agqncy might find itself without appropriated funds if Congress
and the President decide to terminate or sharply modify the operations of the
agency, the 1981 OAG addresses temporary lapses in appropriations. Disagreements during the legislative process over the level of funding for the government as a whole or for a specific agency may delay regular annual appropriations. All parties expect the major functions of the institutions involved to
continue, but in the absence of an appropriation, no one can predict the level
of funding or state with certainty that any funds will be appropriated. Should
the agency maintain its existing operations but forgo new initiatives, or must it
go further and cease all activities that incur expenditures, including compensation for employees? Do the same rules apply for the Internal Revenue Service
and the Forestry Service?
The 1981 OAG answered these questions and became the operational guide
for agencies faced with a lapse in appropriations. In form and reasoning the
1981 OAG resembles a judicial opinion which analyzes the competing claims;
unlike a judge, however, the Attorney General is an active member of the
executive branch and thus the opinion favors the institutional concerns of that
branch and of the President. Even as it acknowledges Congress's primary role
in appropriations through the legislative process, the 1981 OAG secures for
the President and the executive branch considerable discretion over agency
activities. Notwithstanding plausible arguments that the 1981 OAG claims
more for the President and leaves less for Congress than the constitutional and
statutory structure require, its nonconfrontational tone and the limited occurrence of the issue have obviated any adverse reaction from the legislative
branch to date.
I.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE OPINION

The Constitution places initial control over the expenditure of federal money
in the legislative process.7 Article I, section 9, clause 7, forbids any expendiThe legislative and executive branches of the federal government often formulate
positions on legal questions as they arise. One well-documented example concerns the
role of the General Accounting Office (hereinafter GAO) under the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 2701-2753, 98 Stat. 1175, 1182
(codified at 41 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. V 1987)). See Constitutionality of GAO's Bid
Protest Function: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-90
(1985).
1 Questions may arise as to the scope of executive branch discretion after an appropriation. For a discussion of discretion as to impoundment, see generally Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 601, 681-688 (1988) (stating that if Congress does
not make clear whether an act gives presidential discretion, the courts should limit
presidential discretion to those circumstances listed in the Antideficiency Act); Mikva
& Hertz, Impoundment of Funds-The Courts, The Congress, and The President: A
6
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ture without an appropriation "made by law," that is, pursuant to the
processes for legislation stated in article I, section 7: enactment by both
Houses of Congress; presentment to the President for approval; and, if he fails
to approve, passage over a Presidential veto by two-thirds vote in the House
and Senate.'
Legislation reinforces this constitutional requirement.9 The Antideficiency
Act forbids any officer or employee of the United States to make or authorize
an expenditure in excess of appropriated amounts or to obligate the Government for the payment of money in advance of an appropriation unless the
obligation is authorized by law.' 0 Nor may an officer or employee accept voluntary service or employ voluntary service on behalf of the United States in
excess of that authorized by law except in cases of emergency.,, Other provisions require apportionment of appropriated funds over the period of intended
use, to avoid shortages at the end of the period. 2 These rules seek to limit the
creation of moral claims for later appropriations beyond the scope specified in
the legislative scheme. Legislation supports these prohibitions with administra3
tive and criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations.'
An instance of the scope and force of the appropriations requirement
appears in an opinion of the Attorney General issued more than a century
ago. 4 The question addressed has a contemporary ring. Congress had failed to
Constitutional Triangle, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 335, 367, 376-79 (1973) (arguing
impoundment by the president is unconstitutional and executive discretion to withhold
funds should be permitted only in the context of a clear congressional directive). Cf
New York v. Train, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975) (holding the executive branch had no
control over outlays under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
8 Elsewhere, the Constitution requires that the pay of the President and of judges
not be diminished, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7, and U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, thereby
creating constitutional obligations of continual payment. For cases interpreting the
compensation clause, see United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 229 (1986) (holding that
repealing or postponing previously authorized salary increases for federal judges after
they had taken effect violated the compensation clause); Atkins v. United States, 556
F.2d 1028, 1056-57 (Ct. CI. 1977) (holding that a failure to raise federal judicial salaries during an inflationary period did not constitute a discriminatory and thereby
impermissible diminution of judicial compensation), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1009
(1977).
9 Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1982).
10The Act also forbids diversion of an appropriation to an unauthorized purpose. 31
U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1347 (1982). Congress passed and the President signed the general
form of the Antideficiency Act in 1870, Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 7, 16 Stat.
251, but predecessor provisions had applied to major departments of government since
1820. See Act of May 1, 1820, ch. 52, § 6, 3 Stat 568.
1 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
12 Id. §§ 1512-1517 (1982).
'3 Id. §§ 1349, 1518 (providing for administrative penalties) and id. §§ 1350, 1519
(1982 & Supp. V 1987) (providing for criminal penalties).
14 Support of the Army, 15 Op. Att'y Gen. 209, 211 (1877)
[hereinafter Army
OAG].
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appropriate funds for the payment and support of the Army and Navy after
June 30, 1877. Private contributions were proposed as a substitute. 5 The
Attorney General first noted that existing legislation allowed limited action
without an appropriation: a statute authorized the War and Navy Departments to enter contracts for clothing, subsistence and other specified expenditures not in excess of the necessities of the current year. 6 These obligations
required no explicit appropriation under the Antideficiency Act. But no comparable statutory exception existed for ammunition, arms, civilian employees,
and pay for the army, and the Attorney General declined to construe the general statutory authorizations to establish an army and to enter into contracts
of up to five years for enlisted men to supply an implicit exception. 7
The Attorney General rejected the use of private contributions for these
expenditures. He argued in the alternative that outside funds, once paid into
the Treasury, required appropriation just as did other government funds. But
even if the funds were not first paid into the Treasury, he reasoned, they could
not be used as proposed. Whether their use would create a legal obligation for
repayment so as to violate the Act or not, use of the contributions at a minimum would place the government under a moral obligation to repay the funds
and thus seek to do indirectly what Congress should have done directly."
The opinion concluded with two general observations not necessary to its
holding, but reflective of the underlying policies of the appropriations requirement. First, maintenance of an army without a legislative appropriation would
place the executive in a "far from desirable" relationship with those providing
funding. 9 The opinion thus rejected the prospect of dependency by the country's military force on decision-makers outside the structure specified in the
Constitution. 20 Second, the Constitution divides authority over the armed
forces, naming the President as Commander-in-Chief and giving Congress
authority to raise and support armies. To allow private support when the legislative process fails to appropriate funds impermissibly shifts control from Congress. 2' Here, the opinion reaffirmed the division of authority within the government that requires two separate sets of public decisions over the creation
I5 Id. at 209. For a modern exercise in funding government functions by private
contribution see, TAKING THE STAND: TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL OLIVER L.
NORTH 375-77 (Pocket book ed. 1987) (opining that solicitation of fifteen to twenty
million dollars from private donors in the Iran-Contra Affair was in compliance with
the Boland Amendment).
16 Army OAG, supra note 14, at 210. Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 84, § 10, 12 Stat.
220 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. § 11 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).

17

Id.

Is Id. at 211. The opinion merges references to statutory and constitutional authority
and thus leaves uncertain whether the Antideficiency Act was necessary for the result,

rejecting the voluntary contributions, or whether the constitutional restriction contained
in article I, section 9 would have done so by itself. Id. at 209-10.
19 Id. at 211.
20
21

Id.
Id.
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and use of military force.
The opinion thus states the unique position of public spending within the
federal government. It affirms public not private decision-making over the federal fisc. Public decisions over public funds rest in the legislative process.
Neither the moral and practical claims for army pay nor the President's special role as Commander-in-Chief permitted erosion of that decision-making
power. The lines of accountability for spending decisions remain clear. These
principles should continue to apply today.
II.

THE MODERN CONTEXT

While the basic understanding of the appropriations requirement has continued without direct challenge, the stresses of the congressional budget process
in recent years have created new opportunities to test these principles. Major
changes in budget procedures instituted in 1974 sought to facilitate comparisons of total anticipated receipts with total expenditures, but had the inadvertent effect of slowing the process for approval of appropriations.22 In 1980 the
Attorney General rendered an opinion on the appropriate agency behavior
after a failure to appropriate funds for its operation." The opinion addressed
the aftermath of the expiration on April 30, 1980, of a temporary appropriation for the operation of the Federal Trade Commission.2 4 Controversy surrounded the terms of the FTC's continuing authorization and members of
Congress refused to fund the agency unless these issues were resolved; as a
consequence, the agency was faced with the prospect of a significant lapse in
appropriations. 5 The opinion dated April 25, 1980 ("1980 OAG") discussed
26
which activities the agency might continue during the period of a lapse.
The 1980 OAG reviewed some recent history. Since 1950 seven episodes of
lapsed appropriations had occurred, three in the 1950s. 27 Of the three, Congress and the President twice ratified by statute interim obligations without
elaborating the effect of the Antideficiency Act. 28 The other four incidents
took place beginning in 1977, after Congress had altered its budget procedures. Here too, Congress and the President ratified obligations incurred dur22

Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-

688 (1988).
23 Applicability of the Anti-Deficiency Act upon a lapse in Agency Appropriations,
43 Op. Att'y Gen. 24 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 OAG].
24See Act of March 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-219, 94 Stat. 128.
25 Consumer protection activities of the FTC such as proposed regulation of deceptive funeral home practices and children's television programming prompted significant
opposition. See generally 5

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESS AND THE

1977-1980, at 847-48 (1981). One proposal sought a legislative veto over FTC
rules. The legislative veto was later held unconstitutional. See supra note 4.
NATION,

26 1980

27 Id.

OAG, supra note 23, at 1.

at 3 (noting lapses in appropriations in 1952, 1954, 1956, and each year
between 1977 and 1980 inclusive).
28 Id. No ratification occurred on the third occasion.
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ing the lapse period.

29

An agency confronted with a funding lapse must make decisions in the face
of uncertainty as to what amount of appropriation, if any, might become available later. The agency could respond to a funding lapse with one of three
competing cost minimization strategies.
1. Incur no additional expense. This strategy complies literally with the
Antideficiency Act, but it risks losses to existing government investment in
property and creates disruptions in service to the agency's client groups.
2. Incur expenses only as needed to minimize total cost to the government,
assuming the program in question will terminate permanently. While this
strategy protects existing property against loss, it creates the need for start-up
costs if, as appears highly probable, the program in question does continue.
The strategy likely will incur greater future expenses in many cases than lowlevel continuation of the program. The strategy also disrupts agency services.
3. Incur expenses as needed to minimize total cost to the government,
assuming the program will continue at approximately its present level. Given a
high probability of new funding for the program, this strategy will result in
least total government cost in most cases. Also, it produces the minimum disruption of services to clients.
One of the agencies which by reason of its expertise might have provided
guidance on how to behave after an appropriations lapse, the General
Accounting Office ("GAO"), had suffered its own appropriations lapse on
October 1, 1979. 30 The GAO had not closed it doors; instead it issued a memorandum to its employees directing them to restrain new obligations to those
essential to maintain day-to-day operations."a The memorandum said it did not
believe Congress intended the GAO to close down until an appropriation
became law.32 GAO employees thus remained on the job and performed their
regular duties. 3
Nonetheless, even if the federal government became obligated for wages
during a lapse in appropriation the Treasury had to delay payment until an
appropriation was made. As a consequence, a temporary lapse could inconvenience thousands of federal employees, who could not be paid without an
appropriation. To relieve this difficulty, a few members introduced bills to provide authority to continue the pay of employees during an appropriations
lapse.34 In advance of hearings on the bills, Rep. Spellman, Chair of the House
29

Id.

GAO MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 1, 1979, reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. 26,974
(1979) (statement of Sen. Magnuson noting that Congress had failed to pass FY 1980
GAO Appropriation or Continuing Resolution in a timely manner).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 The GAO's approach corresponds to strategy 3, above.
34 See, e.g., H.R. 5704, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 29,689 (1979) (introduction of bill by Rep. Fisher) and H.R. 5995, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
34,158 (1979) (introduction of bill by Rep. Spellman).
30
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Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits, requested an opinion
of the Comptroller General, head of the GAO, as to the effects of the

Antideficiency Act on employee work during a period of lapse. The GAO opinion stated an apparent contradiction in the existing legislation. It concluded
that an officer or employee who permits such employment violates the Act.35
Nevertheless, the opinion said, Congress did not intend to close federal agencies during a period of lapse. The general pattern of ratification of the obligations incurred during the lapse period suggested approval of the agencies' past
behavior in remaining operational. In order to eliminate widespread violations
6
of the Act, the GAO supported the proposed legislation.1
The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"), the budget and accounting arm of the executive branch, apparently had reached a similar conclusion
about agency behavior. Both the OMB and the GAO advised the affected
agencies that they could not incur "controllable obligations" such as hiring,
grantmaking, and nonessential obligations.37 At the hearing on these questions,
however, OMB testified in opposition to the federal pay continuity bills on the
ground that timely passage of appropriations bills was the preferred solution.3"
Securing pay would provide only partial relief, leaving other recipients of federal funds to shoulder the burden. The Justice Department also testified in
opposition.39 The testimony proffered by the Justice Department not only supported the points made by OMB but also elaborated the principles stated in
the 1980 OAG. The Subcommittee's request for this testimony apparently
gave rise to the 1980 OAG.
The 1980 OAG rejected the view that agency employees could continue to
work without an appropriation. It said employee pay obligations cannot be
both unlawful and authorized. Nor could the practice of ratification create
legal authority; indeed, the very practice suggests a lack of authority.40 In
35 Federal Pay

Continuity Act: Hearings on H.R. 5995 Before the Subcomm. on
Compensation and Employment Benefits of the House Comm. on the Post Office and
Civil Serv., 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 80 (1980).

Id.
31 Id. at 82-83.
38 Id. It treated appropriation through a continuing resolution as an acceptable stopgap measure.
39 Id. at 94-97.
40 1980 OAG, supra note 23, at 4. The OAG argued that if authority to obligate
36

existed without subsequent ratification, the apparent authority of government officers

would create judicially enforceable obligations. Id. The legal doctrine on apparent
authority, however, seems to be to the contrary. See, e.g., Mammoth Oil Company v.
United States, 275 U.S. 13, 43 (1927) (holding that a lease agreement for fuel oil
storage negotiated by the former Secretary of the Interior was unenforceable); Sutton
v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, 579 (1921) (holding that the Secretary of War could
not make a contract binding the government to pay more than the appropriated
amount); Ferguson v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 649, 654 (1925) (holding a contract for
government purchase of artillery spokes invalid because the officer making the contract
had acted outside the scope of his authority), affid, 273 U.S. 660 (1927). Accord City
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short, nothing can bridge the gap when an appropriation lapses except authorization by law to incur obligations. An expectation that an appropriation will
be forthcoming cannot suffice. The Justice Department accordingly disagreed
with the GAO opinion, particularly its conclusion that Congress did not intend
federal agencies to close during a period of lapsed appropriations. "Faithful
execution of the laws cannot rest on mere speculation" about a legislative
intent, the 1980 OAG primly noted,41 referring to the President's constitutional obligation to carry out federal law, including the mandate of the
Antideficiency Act.42 The failure to appropriate funds unambiguously ends
agency authority to create government obligations. It does not create a lacuna
to be filled by interpretation. Any other rule undermines the purpose of the
Antideficiency Act, to insure that Congress determines the purposes and
amounts of government expenditures. The OAG found no exception even to
avoid greater costs to the agency at a later date. It thus rejected a general cost
minimization standard based on probable continuation of the agency
43
programs.
The 1980 OAG, however, did infer one statutory exception. Federal officials,
in taking the necessary and proper steps for the performance of their duties,
could incur those minimal obligations necessary to close down their agencies in
an orderly way." Failure to do so could incur far greater costs than the salary
and other obligations required for an orderly shutdown. Presumably, the
exception rested on a rationale like that for strategy two, above, and the OAG
read the Antideficiency Act to require the agency to minimize costs, but on
the assumption of a permanent shutdown. In short, the OAG replaced the
relatively painless curtailment of discretionary obligations under the GAOOMB view with a ban on all new obligations, including pay for agency personnel, except as necessary to close down the agency.
The 1980 OAG reasoned from the language and history of the statute, citing no cases in support of its views. 4 Although the Supreme Court has not
definitively construed the Antideficiency Act in this context, it has discussed
the Act as well as the underlying appropriations requirement of article I, secof Jonesboro v. Shaw-Lightcap, Inc., 112 Ga. App. 890, 892, 147 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1966)
(holding that the mayor of Jonesboro, acting alone, was without authority to bind the
city in contract).
41 1980 OAG, supra note 23, at 4.
42 The "faithful execution" clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7, which may have
been intended as a limitation on presidential power to dispense with laws of which he
disapproved, has been used as a source of implied presidential power. See Feld, Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?, 21 GA. L. REV. 171, 209-10 (1986)
(discussing the Supreme Court's opinion in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926), and its expansive notion of presidential control over the executive branch
grounded, in part, in the faithful execution clause).
41 1980 OAG supra note 23, at 4-5.
44 Id. at 6.
41Id. at 4-5.
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tion 9.46 The draftsman of the 1980 OAG might have thought language or
logic from these cases persuasive even if not controlling. Instead, the 1980
OAG underscored its conclusion more effectively, by announcing that the Justice Department would enforce the criminal provision of the Antideficiency
Act in "appropriate" cases. 47 Any official who continued to follow the more
relaxed interpretation offered previously by the GAO and the OMB did so at
personal peril.
The Attorney General had neither an obviously partisan position nor a substantial institutional stake in the outcome of this particular 1980 inquiry. The
President and the majorities in both houses of Congress came from the same
political party. The FTC, an independent agency, operated outside the organizational lines of the executive branch. A conclusion that the FTC must close
down temporarily would not adversely affect the President or the operation of
line departments within the executive branch. Substantive rules already issued
by the FTC would remain in force. Although enforcement of certain antitrust
and consumer protection norms might halt temporarily, few outside the government likely would experience significant inconveniences or difficulties. For
those who viewed the FTC more as a creature of Congress than the President,
a temporary shutdown due to Congress's failure to agree on an appropriation
even suggested a measure of political irony. Like its predecessor opinion more
than a century earlier, the 1980 OAG affirmed the full measure of legislative
control over expenditures and obligation of funds through the appropriations
process.
III.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION OF

16

JANUARY

1981

The pressure of increasing deficits soon converted congressional difficulty in
passing timely appropriations bills for particular agencies into a more general
appropriations lapse. As of September 30, 1980, Congress had enacted neither
eleven of thirteen regular appropriations bills nor a continuing resolution for
the new fiscal year. 4 An OMB memorandum, approved by the Justice Department, to all departments and agencies, directed that beginning October 1
See Leiter v. United States, 271 U.S. 204, 206-07 (1926) (holding that a lease to
the government for a term of years made without specific authority of law under an
appropriation for one fiscal year is binding on the government only for that year);
Bradley v. United States, 98 U.S. 104, 106-08, 117 (1878) (holding that a lease executed by the Postmaster-General for a term of three years could not be enforced
beyond the two years for which the Congress had appropriated funds for the rental);
Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877) (holding that a presidential pardon of
parties whose property was confiscated pursuant to the Confiscation Act of 1862 did
46

not allow those parties to reclaim the property without congressional authorization).
See also Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (stating that
no money could be removed from the Treasury absent an appropriation by an act of
Congress).
47 1980 OAG, supra note 23, at 6.
48 See 1981 OAG, supra note 5, at 1 n.1.
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agencies might continue activities otherwise authorized by law, that protect
life and property, and begin to phase down other activities; it also provided
some examples.49 The OAG of 16 January 1981 purported to provide a "close
and more precise" analysis of the issues addressed in the memorandum. 0 In
fact, it stressed a series of rationales that go beyond the memorandum itself
and the prior OAGs.5 '
The 1981 OAG reaffirmed the general rule of the 1980 FTC-related opinion: without an appropriation the agency must close down. But the general
appropriation lapse contemplated in the 1981 OAG created the prospect of
much wider disruption by reason of curtailed government services. The agencies potentially affected lay at the center of the executive branch, and their
responsibilities included the deployment of the armed forces and the payment
of basic economic grants to individuals. The President's advisers might care
little if the FTC temporarily shut down or might smile at the discomfiture of
the GAO in failing to receive a timely appropriation from its master, the Congress. But interruption of Coast Guard patrols, presidential travel, or payments to social security recipients posed far more serious concerns. The 1980
OAG had obviated any reliance on a presumed intention of Congress as to
whether a particular function should close down in a temporary appropriation
lapse. The later OAG accordingly focused most of its attention on creating
flexibility to carry on certain operations through express or implied exceptions
to the general rule.
The Antideficiency Act contains one explicit exception that allows the creation of Government obligations where "authorized by law." 52 The 1981 OAG
accordingly expounded the varieties of express and implied authorization. Perhaps the clearest authorization consists of an appropriation not limited to a
single year. An agency or function funded in this way does not require an
annual appropriation and the agency may continue to spend and obligate
funds in spite of a general appropriations lapse. As another example, a statute
may expressly authorize an agency to incur obligations without regard to
appropriations or may imply such power. But as the 1981 OAG states, such
authority cannot be inferred from a simple general grant of authority, else
every statute that provides for the creation of an agency or authorizes a governmental function would confer the power to waive the Antideficiency Act.
The power to obligate without an appropriation must rest on a clearer
directive.
An extended footnote in the 1981 OAG used an imaginative combination of
these exceptions to justify continuation of social security and other similar
49Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from the Office
of Management and Budget (Sept. 30, 1981) (unpublished memorandum on file with
author). Nevertheless, even in the absence of appropriations, the memorandum directed
all staff to report to work.
50 1981 OAG,supra note 5, at 1.
51 Id.

52 Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(B) (1982).
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entitlement payments. 53 By statute a trust bearing a permanent appropriation
disbursed old age and disability payments so that the disbursements themselves encountered no appropriation lapse. 54 The salaries of the employees who
issue the checks and the other expenses of administration, however, required
an annual appropriation. 55 The 1981 OAG inferred authority to incur wages
and other expenses of administering the program from the continuing appropriation for the benefit payments, and the entitlement nature of the program.
The trust fund appropriation embodied an intention that the benefits payments
should continue and therefore someone must write checks, mail them and perform the other services needed to deliver the benefits. 56 The OAG rejected the
alternative logic, that the lapse in administrative authority reflected Congress's
intent to discontinue the benefit payments. The OAG emphasized that an entitlement formula determines the benefits payments, thus implying that this factor helps to resolve the essentially inconsistent results inferred from the conflicting forms of appropriation in favor of keeping the employees at their jobs.
The result-continuation of social security and other entitlement benefits
despite an appropriations lapse-seems sensible. The 1981 OAG reached it
without trying to predict whether the legislative process would provide the necessary annual appropriation in due course, an inquiry foreclosed by the 1980
OAG. Although the 1981 OAG did not say so, it instead treated the conflicting forms of appropriation as an ambiguity to be resolved by reference to the
entitlement character of the program. The 1981 OAG left unclear how to use
these criteria to resolve similar conflicts for other programs that the federal
government runs on permanent appropriations, such as the Highway Trust
Fund," whose employees receive payment on annual appropriations. 8 If the
permanence of the appropriation constitutes the determining factor for the
social security fund, then the salaries and other expenses the Department of
Transportation incurs should continue. If, however, entitlement constitutes the
critical factor, a different result from that of social security should obtain.
The 1981 OAG created an even more imaginative exception for the President. The opinion began with a controversial premise: where the Constitution
grants to the President personal power to act, Congress "manifestly" could not
deprive him of the power by denying him the minimal obligational authority to
carry out the power.59 The example used by the OAG to illustrate this
53 1981 OAG, supra note 5, at 7 n.7.

42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (Supp. V 1987).
15Id. § 401(g).
56 The OAG did not expressly consider whether the full cadre of attendants should
be implied or whether some functions of the Social Security Administration not
directly related to current disbursement of benefits might close down temporarily. See
1981 OAG, supra note 5, at 7 n.7.
57 23 U.S.C. § 120 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
58Id. § 104.
19 1981 OAG, supra note 5, at 8-9.
14
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assumption seems odd, the Presidential power to grant pardons.60 What minimal obligational authority except perhaps the expenses of pen, ink, and paper
is necessary to carry out this power? Part of the value of this example for the
OAG doubtless lay in its status as one of the few powers the Constitution
explicitly grants to the President to exercise alone. But the pardon power carries legal baggage. The OAG does not cite a trio of post-Civil War Supreme
Court cases that deal with the relationship between the pardon power and
appropriations, perhaps because they undercut rather than support the premise
as stated.6"

All three cases involved post-Civil War treatment of property which had

62
been captured or confiscated from southerners. United States v. Klein
63
involved the 1863 Abandoned and Captured Property Act, which authorized
the government to act as trustee of property until the owners proved that they
had given no aid and comfort to the enemy. The Act also authorized the President to grant amnesty and pardons to rebels. 64 A series of presidential pardons
65
followed, some after repeal of the statutory authorization.
Wilson, Klein's decedent, had complied with the conditions stated for full
pardon and restoration of all property rights, by taking the oath of allegiance.
66
The Court of Claims held Klein could recover for cotton seized from Wilson.
The United States appealed. Meanwhile, a proviso added to the 1870 Appropriations Act sought to divest the Supreme Court of power to decide for
Klein; 67 it said that presidential pardons were not admissible as evidence in
support of any claim against the United States nor could they be considered
on appeal; 68 and it denied jurisdiction to hear any appeal from the Court of
69
Claims if proof of the claimant's loyalty was founded on a pardon.

The Court properly held the proviso void. It found an impermissible intru-

sion on both judicial and executive branch powers.70 As to the latter, the Court
11, § 2, cl. 1. Stith, using different examples, asserts that Congress would violate the Constitution if it refused to appropriate funds for the President
to receive foreign ambassadors or to make treaties. Stith, Congress' Power of the
Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1350 (1988). However, she does not suggest what minimum
level of spending would satisfy the assumed constitutional norm nor what remedy
should be available for its violation.
61 Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877); The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 92 (1873); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
60

U.S. CoNsT. art.

62 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).

Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820.
Id.
65 See Act of January 21, 1867, ch. 8, 14 Stat. 377.
66 Wilson's Case, 4 Ct. Cl. 559, 568 (1868).
67 Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
68 Indeed, the proviso stated that acceptance of a pardon without a written protest
constituted an admission of prior disloyalty. Id.
.69 Id.
10Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. As to the intrusion on the judicial branch, compare Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (holding that a statute to
63
64
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said legislation could not limit the President's pardon power. 7 Repeal of the
specific authorization left his constitutional pardon power in full vigor. Congress was therefore required to give full effect to the pardon. The 1863 Act did
not divest owners of title to property and it was up to the government to determine whether to restore the proceeds of any sale to the original owner. The
pardon and its related promises provided the framework for doing so.
Any implication in Klein that presidential action alone could restore seized
property where title had passed to the United States dissolved, however, in
The Confiscation Cases." The applicable statute there, the 1862 Confiscation
Act, took for the United States certain categories of property owned by Confederate officials.73 On a suit to confiscate certain property, the owners unsuccessfully argued that the later proclamations of amnesty barred the taking.74
Presidential amnesty, the Court said, could not repeal the Confiscation Act or
divest rights earlier vested in the United States.75
Finally, in Knote v. United States7 6 plaintiff alleged that the presidential
proclamation of amnesty of December 25, 1868 released him of all penalties
for the crime for which his property had been seized under the Confiscation
Act and entitled him to the net proceeds of the sale of the property which had
been paid into the Treasury. The Supreme Court disagreed. Whatever the
scope of the pardon power, the opinion said, it cannot touch monies in the
Treasury of the United States.77 The Knote court thus construed the language
in Klein so as to require, not waive, an article I appropriation when a pardon
takes money out of the Treasury.78
Without noting the limits that the appropriations requirement places on the
President's pardon power, the 1981 OAG extended its zealous view of inherent
presidential power to permit the exercise of obligational authority in two directions.79 First, presidential obligational authority could apply to all other powers of the President grounded in his constitutional role, including those not
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. The OAG thus extended the
domain for enlarged obligational authority to areas of the President's "peculiar institutional powers and competency." 80 It disclaimed any catalogue of
repeal the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases prevented the
Court from rendering judgment in an appeal previously argued, but not yet decided).
71 Klin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147.
72 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1873).
71Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589, 590.
74The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 101.
75 Id. at 112-13.
76 95 U.S. 149 (1877); accord Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 67 (1886) (holding that no presidential pardon could have the effect of authorizing payment without
Congress's approval).
77Knote, 95 U.S. at 155.
78 Id.
79 1981 OAG, supra note 5, at 8.
80 Id. at 9.
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such power, but included as one example, "the conduct of foreign relations
essential to the national security."'" To support this position the OAG invoked
the canon of statutory construction that an interpretation of a statute should
avoid grave constitutional doubts.82 Accordingly, it said, the Antideficiency
Act should not preclude obligational authority the President could have exercised absent the statute.83 The reasoning seems circular in that it assumes significant inherent obligational authority for the President: if the President has
no inherent spending power without any statute, how far can this conclusion
carry? Perhaps the OAG meant only that no criminal violation of the
84
Antideficiency Act arises from such exercises of obligational authority.
Second, without expressly noting the transition, the OAG moved from discussion of powers the President exercises personally to those exercised through
subordinates.8 5 This category encompasses the entire executive branch. For
example, does the OAG mean that the State Department may operate at full
staff during an appropriations lapse? The 1981 OAG does not advert specifically to the President's Commander-in-Chief power, but apparently contemplates no reduction in military activity during an appropriation lapse. But if
the President had inherent obligational authority to keep the armed forces
going during the lapse, what remains of the Attorney General opinion a century earlier?8" The concerns there expressed, to preserve accountability for
spending within the legislative process, seem to require a narrower reach for
the President's discretion. 7
1I Id. at 10 n.10.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 11.
84 The combination of past practice and the 1981 OAG position arguably obviate the
necessary criminal intent in any event.
85 1981 OAG, supra note 5, at 8.
86

See Army OAG, supra note 14.

A subsequent opinion of the Attorney General involved a question of payment of
wages to members of the uniformed military services during an appropriation lapse. 43
Op. Att'y Gen. 32 (1982). In August 1982, the relevant appropriation accounts covered
the amount of military pay to be disbursed to members of the armed forces at the end
of the month, but not the federal income and FICA taxes to be withheld. Existing
Treasury regulations required the transfer of the withheld amounts at the end of
August, Treas. Reg. §§ 31.6302(c)-i (1982), but the Secretary of the Treasury proposed to change the regulation to adjust the due date to the end of September. Id.
The opinion authorized the payment of full take-home pay. Id. No statute requires
an employer to have funds available to pay the withheld amounts before the stated due
date. While the Treasury might have a superior claim if an employer had to choose
between timely payment of the withholding amount and take-home pay, under the new
Treasury regulation the withheld amounts did not become due to the Treasury until a
month later. Id. No violation of the Antideficiency Act would occur because no expenditure in excess of appropriation would take place. The opinion recognized that Department of Defense would incur an obligation for the withheld amounts, but did not treat
that as a violation of the Antideficiency Act, presumably because it would not obligate
87
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According to the 1981 OAG,"although government agencies without express
appropriations do not derive obligational authority from their general authority to operate, the President has an undefined reservoir of powers to obligate
the Treasury in advance of appropriations. The OAG exploited two kinds of
ambiguity to suggest a large area of presidential discretion during periods of
lapsed appropriations. First, as noted, the possible areas of presidential power
go undefined. At various times the President and his supporters have asserted
inherent power to commit U.S. troops,"8 to impound appropriated funds, 9 and
even to take property. 90 The 1981 OAG leaves to the President the task of
determining which of these positions will support obligational authority. 91 Second, the OAG construed the Antideficiency Act but left unclear whether the
Act simply restates constitutional requirements. The extent to which the legislative process could narrow or eliminate the President's discretion remains
elusive.92
The second prohibition contained in the Antideficiency Act bars acceptance
of "voluntary service" for the United States except in cases of emergency
the government to pay money to anyone outside the government. Id. (citing Reeside v.
Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1851)).
The opinion made no reference to any inherent powers of the President to authorize
or make the necessary payments.
88 See Legal Opinion of Presidential Counsel Lloyd Cutler, Counsel to Former President Carter, on War Powers Consultation Relative to the Iran Rescue Mission,
reprinted in Hearings on the War Powers Resolution Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th

Cong., 1st Sess. 50-51 (1983) (opining that the mission was a lawful exercise of the
President's constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief and thus did not violate the
War Powers Act).
89 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 616 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (declaring that the President could not refuse to allow pay raises mandated
by the Federal Pay Comparability Act to take effect). See also supra note 7.
90See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (reviewing an Executive Order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most
of the nation's steel mills).
91 Such a broad claim of discretion runs counter to the model of the federal government's separation of powers such as that described by Justice Jackson in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (defining three categories of presidential actions in descending order of legitimacy; those authorized by Congress, those which Congress has not acted upon, and those incompatible with the
express or implied will of Congress).
92 The 1981 OAG does not separately address the limit on spending without an
appropriation contained in article 1, sec. 9 of the Constitution. While the general rule
of the Antideficiency Act was intended to be congruent with the constitutional prohibition, the same may not be so of the exceptions the OAG finds in the statute. Either the
Constitution excepts the catalog of inherent presidential powers from the article I
appropriations rule, a serious modification of the generally understood requirement, or
the 1981 OAG reads the Antideficiency Act itself as an affirmative "appropriation" to
the extent of the "authorized by law" provision.
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involving the safety of human life or the protection of property. 9 The prohibition entered the statute in 188494 to prevent unauthorized regular or overtime
service followed by claims for compensation. As in the other section of the
statute, the OAG focused on the exception, here for cases of emergency. Based
on a language change in 195095 and administrative construction of a related
statutory provision that uses the same language, 96 the OAG construed the
emergency exception broadly, to require only a reasonable relationship
between the possible harm to life or property and the funded activity. Among
the examples the OAG invoked are FBI criminal investigations, legal services
by the Department of Agriculture in connection with state meat inspection
programs and enforcement of the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967, 91 and protection and management of commodity inventories by the Commodity Credit
Corporation.98 Also, the OMB memorandum included tax collection. Thus, not
only could the Veterans Administration continue to operate hospitals and air
traffic controllers to direct planes, but building guards, food inspectors, and
law enforcement officials could continue to perform their services even in the
absence of an appropriation.
The 1981 OAG went beyond a generous definition of services related to
emergencies. It extended this exception to the purchase of materials necessary
to meet emergencies. The OAG said this authority derives from the need to
carry out the intention that emergencies be dealt with effectively. If Congress
allows the government to accept the services of firefighters, it "surely" must
have intended to make water and firetrucks available. 99 The OAG thus converted a statute that limits employment obligations into affirmative obligational authority to acquire material.
The emergency nature of the circumstance must operate to constrain such
inferences. In the ordinary case, an appropriation for part of a job cannot
imply authority to spend money for the balance. Such an open-ended inference
would seriously undercut centralized control over the timing and amount of
government spending. If the exception applies only to unforseen emergencies it
presents no serious challenge to fiscal management. The OAG's broad interpretation of emergency, however, which does not rest on surprise or suddenness, apparently would create enormous obligational discretion. Two limitations are possible. First, the OAG does not state but may mean to imply that
obligations incurred for material must be limited by the prior practice. The
FAA thus could not use a funding lapse as an occasion to acquire new radar
31 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
Act of May 1, 1884, ch. 37, 23 Stat. 15, 17.
91 Act of September 6, 1950, ch. 896, § 1211, 64 Stat. 596, 765.
96 1981 OAG, supra note 5, at 13 (discussing the interpretation by the Bureau of the
Budget and the OMB of 31 U.S.C. § 665(e)(1976) (current version as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 1515(b) (1982))).
97 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1967).
98 1981 OAG, supra note 5, at 14.
99 Id. at 16.
93
94
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systems for air traffic controllers even if the equipment reasonably can be
expected to preserve life and property better than before. Second, the OAG
may have relied on the practical limitations implicit in an appropriations lapse,
that the short time interval expected before an explicit appropriation limits the
amount to be spent on material.
The 1981 OAG did take the expected lapse interval into account in its treatment of agency behavior-an apparent modification of the 1980 OAG, 00 concerning the Federal Trade Commission. The 1980 OAG allowed departments
to terminate operations in an orderly way. But to minimize unnecessary
expense, agencies should incur obligations for shutdown only when the lapse in
appropriations justifies it. In effect, agencies must estimate the duration of the
lapse to determine whether it justifies specific shutdown expenses. The earlier
GAO standard, that Congress didn't intend for the agency to shut down,' 0' has
given way to closing the agency until the anticipated appropriation, unless
doing so would be more costly than keeping it open.
The 1981 OAG did not discuss application of these principles to the judiciary. To what extent may the judicial branch continue to obligate funds during
a period of lapsed appropriations? The Constitution requires that pay for federal judges continue, 02 but what of other court personnel? Some state courts
have found inherent power in the judiciary to incur expenses reasonably necessary to operate the courts. 103 These expressions may depend upon the particular configuration of the state constitution and in any event run contrary to
general understandings of the federal judiciary. Possible constitutional requirements apart, the logic of the 1981 OAG at a minimum would allow at least
some court operations to continue in order to preserve life or property.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In one sense, the practical effect of the 1981 OAG is quite limited. It
applies only in rare circumstances, when the legislative process cannot agree in
a timely fashion on either a regular appropriation or a continuing resolution.
Yet when a lapse does occur, the holding assures that the effects become pub100See 1981
101Id. at 4.
'02

OAG, supra note 5, at 2 n.2.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

103A

leading case is O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, 362
Mass. 507, 510, 287 N.E.2d 608, 612 (1972) (recognizing the inherent power of judges
to obtain goods and services even in the absence of an appropriation or authorizing
statute). See generally Note, The Courts' Inherent Power To Compel Legislative
Funding of Judicial Functions, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1687 (1983) (discussing generally

the justification for and history of the use of judicial power to obligate funds); Comment, CongressionalUnderappropriationfor Civil Juries:Responding to the Attack on
a Constitutional Guarantee, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 237 (1988) (arguing that the seventh

amendment compels Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to pay jury fees and juror
expenses and that in the absence of such appropriation courts have the self-executing
power to make those payments).
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lic and theatrical. The Statue of Liberty has closed down and the White
House has cancelled tours for the public.' 4 These symbolic events focus public
attention on the departure from orderly funding processes. At the same time,
under the 1981 OAG, presidential as opposed to agency business may continue
as usual. Managerial decisions at the agency or OMB level can determine the
extent to which obligations for personnel and even materials may be incurred
without prior appropriation.
But the reasoning of the 1981 OAG fundamentally distorts the constitutional allocation of power over the governmental purse. While the 1981 OAG
reaffirmed the power of the legislative process to control appropriations
through inaction as well as action, it created wide areas of discretion that the
President and executive branch subordinates may exercise during a period of
lapse. Nothing in the opinion restricts presidential discretion where, contrary
to the previous appropriations lapses, the period of lapse exceeds a day or two.
Legislation could challenge this dubious assertion of executive prerogative;
it could seek to narrow the area of discretion. By enacting guidelines that the
executive branch is required to follow in the face of a lapse in appropriations;
Congress could effectively override the OAG's directive and reaffirm its commitment to the notion of separation-of-powers. The opinion, however, creates
few incentives for the legislative process to give the matter priority; it neither
confronts congressional spending power directly nor adversely affects it on a
day-to-day basis. Congressional action nevertheless should be driven by the
fact that the 1981 OAG subtly tips the scales towards the executive branch.
At present, the 1981 OAG occupies the field. By purporting to add a part of
the power of the purse to other presidential discretion, the OAG undermines
the most viable limitation that legislation and the Constitution places on executive discretion.
104 Keller, Fund Gap Led to Sweeping Shutdown . . . But No Lapse in Essential
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